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Goals and objectives: appointing the limits and scope of the investigation 
„Just be yourself and everything is gonna be all right.” This short and trivial sentence, 
however simple and banal it may sound, hides much within, and epitomizes all that I propose 
to investigate in my dissertation. For it expresses a deeply rooted belief, a conviction whose 
origins and value have been almost completely ignored: that if man becomes himself, 
everything is going to be all right. What does this tell us? First, that man is not being himself. 
Second, that not everything is all right. Thus I shall investigate how is it possible that man 
does not coincide with himself, why does this pose a problem, and how to remedy this 
situation. In other words, I go after the transformation and getting over of a certain 
philosophical tradition`s – existentialism – characteristic notion – authenticity – to our 
everyday lives` praxis through the practice of psychotherapy. 
“Be spontaneous, be yourself!”, we can hear this and other similar pieces of life guiding 
advice from our friends, teachers, we can read them in our favourite novels, or can easily 
decipher their general presence on paintings, photographs, movies and, likewise, in 
commonplace thinking. If somebody does not behave the way we would expect him to 
behave, that is, if he is out of character, it triggers surprise, or, at times, abashment, or even 
disapproval. What does this indicate? That we all assume: people do possess a fixed and 
stable character that characterizes them (Dad is courageous, Steve is smart, Erika is deceptive 
etc.). Character is called character precisely because it characterizes. When someone does not 
match the picture of his character he is not being himself. If a drunken person severely 
offends his boss, verbally abuses his wife, and slaps his son, we often say: because of the 
alcohol he is currently not being himself. When he sobers up, recalling his memories may 
make him feel ashamed of himself for doing – under the influence of the booze – what he did 
as not himself. To his apologies, his boss, wife and son might react: “you are being yourself
again, at last”. This reaction implies that everybody feels it natural that we are capable of 
being not ourselves, and on the other hand, that this is merely a temporary and less 
appropriate state of ours, compared to the one when we coincide with ourselves. Shame is, 
among others, the sign of us accepting this very conviction, too, that we should behave as 
ourselves, we should stick to our character, and any deviation from the familiar shores is 
dangerous and, at the same time, morally wrong. 
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In order to become ourselves, first we need to get to know to our selves. But how is it 
possible to get to know to a self that exists only amidst constant change and fluctuation? 
Furthermore, is there, at all, a unified ideal of authenticity within the existentialist tradition, 
or rather every author means something else by using the expressions “self”, and “becoming 
oneself”? Inauthenticity, that is when we do not coincide with ourselves, is evidently a less 
valuable state of existence than authenticity for all the philosophers we are to examine. It is 
not a marginal question, then, whether being inauthentic carries any moral weight. As for 
Heidegger, as is well known, he does not have an ethical work. He himself expressed it 
several times crystal clearly that any attempt for moral interpretation of his seemingly ethical 
concepts in Being and Time – like conscience, sin, freedom, autonomy, etc. – is out of tone. 
Nevertheless, it is rather confusing, to say the least, that he finds appropriate to use these very 
terms for labeling the allegedly purely ontological categories. That is why it is not 
remarkably surprising that many still interpret his notion of authenticity as an ethical ideal, 
instead of plainly accepting Heidegger`s insistence on the moral neutrality of them. 
Heidegger might not, but Sartre certainly did care about ethics and wrote in great detail 
on the subject, in connection with authenticity and inauthenticity. This is the tradition upon 
which existential psychiatry and psychotherapy had established its theory and practice. 
Existential psychotherapy is a unique approach in virtue of the fact that it scrutinizes psychic 
phenomena from an existentialist point of view. What it entailis is that existential therapists 
understand man as Being-in-the-World or existence, not as a substantive subject that is torn 
from the objective, “outside” reality. Existential psychiatry began forming around the fist 
reception of Heidegger`s Being and Time – that is, the 1930s – but it had become really 
influential from the 1960s. At the beginning, such psychiatrists like Ludwig Binswanger and 
Medard Boss had attempted to elaborate on the putting into practice what Heidegger had to 
say about Dasein`s fundamental ontological structures. What this means is that under the 
name of Daseinanalysis, both Binswanger and Boss worked on how one might utilize 
phenomenology`s insights in understanding and curing the mentally ill. Later on, the 
Austrian-born Viktor Frankl also established a distinct existential school for which he coined 
the name, Logotherapy, and which is alive and kicking ever since. 
By the end of the 1950s, the existential approach to psychiatry and psychotherapy has 
arrived in the US, and, along with the so-called humanistic movements in psychology, it has 
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gained considerable influence after a remarkably brief period of time. Rollo May and Irvin 
Yalom are the most well-known and acknowledged representatives of the American school. 
Meanwhile in Great Britain, it was Ronald Laing who first offered analyses of 
psychopathological and psychotherapeutic phenomena from an existential-phenomenological 
stance. Later on members of the British School of Existential Analysis came to reform the 
principles of existential therapy. Their objective was to strip, as much as possible, the 
therapeutic setting from the urge to diagnose the exact “disease”, the pathologization, and the 
habit of moral evaluation of medical data. Instead they suggested that therapy should focus 
on the phenomenological description of the “lived world” of the patient. The most notable 
existential therapists of the British School are Emmy van Deurzen, Hans Cohn and Ernesto 
Spinelli. 
Existential psychiatry and therapy were born out of the elementary dissatisfaction with 
the ways psychiatrists tried to cure conventionally conceived “diseases” of conventionally 
conceived “subjects”, whereas, for existentialists none of these are adequate modes of either 
grasping human reality, or trying to advance the well-being of the individual. In my 
dissertation, I essay to critically inspect, via a concrete phenomenon, the actual appearance of 
existential philosophy in practice The medium in which I analyse existential philosophy 
manifesting itself into practical life is existential psychotherapy, while the concrete 
phenomenon that guided the directions and the limits of the investigations is the idea(l) of 
authenticity; that is to say, the metamorphoses and getting over of the philosophical ideal of 
authenticity to the realm of psychotherapy. As I was intent to demonstrate, authenticity is the
central concept of philosophical and psychotherapeutic relevance that provides the specific 
feature of existential psychotherapy. The essential function and aim of therapy is, thus, 
nothing less than to lead the invidual to his authentic self. Then again, the firm belief in the 
veracity of the claim that becoming yourself brings you mental health, or, to put it in another 
way, that mental health is the same as authenticity, is conditioned by existential philosophy 
itself. 
 Nonetheless, I believe it is important to emphasize that the theoreticians of existential 
psychotherapy did, right from the beginning, misinterpret and re-form – intentionally or not – 
the various teachings of existential philosophers according to their own taste and needs. 
Although I reckon that this was a necessary step they were pressed to make, for these 
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philosophically unacceptable misinterpretations had led to an utterly viable practice. So much 
so that I have had gradually come to acquire a hunch that the particular analyses of existential 
philosophies, though aspiring to reveal human reality in the most complete and creditable 
manner possible, sometimes failed to stick to actual human reality. So, from psychotherapy`s 
point of view, it had become inevitable to revise some of the concepts and ideas of existential 
philosophy, in order to transform and, occasionally, even correct them, for better usage in real 
life situations. Examination of these phenomena was also part of the task I had taken on. 
The thread and directions of the examinations 
The thread of my examination was laid down by the following up of the changing 
notion of authenticity qua genuine mode of being of human individuals. The dissertation has 
been articulated into the following structure: 
Chapter I: The analysis of the philosophical concept of authenticity in the works of five 
prominent existential philosophers` oeuvre. The fist subsection deals with Kierkegaard`s, the 
second with Nietzsche`s, the third with Jaspers`, the fourth with Heidegger`s, and the fifth 
with Sartre`s relevant passages. 
Chapter II: The analysis of the therapeutical ideal of authenticity in eminent existential 
psychotherapists` works. The first subsection examines the beginnings of existential 
psychotherapy (Jaspers` topical writings, the Daseinanalysis, and Logotherapy), the second 
the American existential psychotherapy, the third R. D. Laing`s existential-phenomenological 
approach, and the fourth the British School`s (in particular, van Deurzen`s) teachings. 
Chapter III: Critical analyses by way of outlining the path roamed about by the ideal of 
authenticity. The final chapter seeks to find answer to the question whether practical 
application of existential philosophy unavoidably leads to the misinterpretation, 
oversimplification, and revision of certain particular philosophical concepts. On the other 
hand, I also query if the self-interpretation of existential psychotherapy is being carried out in 
good faith indeed, that is, to what extent is it able to exercise in practice what it undertakes: 
being an entirely value-free therapy. Moreover, I go after the widely held conviction, too, that 
the imperative of authenticity in our culture, as we know it today, is really the best one if one 
wants to live a mentally healthy, good life. At this point, I shall point to the inherent 
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controversies and dangers residing in the ideal of authenticity, along with showing the 
relationship of this ideal to morality. Does existential therapy cultivate deviance, the 
deviation from society`s norms, and, through this, immoralism? I propose to give an attempt 
to answer these questions as well. 
Results of the dissertation 
Hopefully, the analyses of the dissertation demonstrated clearly that the ideal of 
authenticity cannot be synthesized into one, single, coherent concept, simply because various 
existentialist philosophers gave very different, and, at times, divergent accounts of how one 
should become oneself, and what does this all entail. Being authentic implies that one is 
absolutely honest to oneself. It is a common point for everybody, no doubt about that. 
However, the concept of authenticity is not equal to any of the concepts of honesty, autonomy, 
or self-realization. Self-realization, for instance, is a morally edifying ideal of whose origins 
can be traced back to the era of Romanticism. It takes for granted a moral subject that is 
apparently much more integrated, compact and capable of completion than the one offered by 
existentialism which is essentially a possibility-for-being, not an already fixed substance. 
The investigations also pointed out that existential psychiatry misunderstood or 
deliberately misinterpreted several core existential concepts. A good example is the case of 
anxiety (Angst) which, for every single last one of the existentialist philosophers, is 
fundamentally different from fear, in that significant respect that whereas fear always has an 
object, anxiety never does. This basic differentiation obviously did not made its way through 
to existential psychiatry and psychotherapy. But this is, in my view, absolutely 
understandable, moreover, acceptable, because, for psychotherapy, anxiety must have an 
object, otherwise it is incomprehensibe and of no use for therapeutic purposes. A like 
misunderstanding or misinterpration derives from the confusion about the “nature” of 
authenticity. At many occasions, I have attempted to show that the ideal of authenticity in 
psychotherapy differs overly from any of those we can find in philosophers` writings. For 
Kierkegaard, Nierzsche, and Sartre, becoming authentic, becoming truly who one is, is an 
imperative open only for the few. Niezsche acknowledges this, Sartre unfortunately does not. 
Initially, the ideal of authenticity was an openly elitist ideal, which despised the mob, and 
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celebrated the – rare – noble individual. However, in psychiatry it has become a fairly 
democratic and univerasal ideal which can be “attained” by virtually anyone and everyone. 
When analyzing Heidegger`s argumentations about Eigentlichkeit, I have devoted a 
considerable amount of time to clarify the status of the allegedly ethical connotations of 
numerous terms. Contrary to the generally accepted belief, I claim that authenticity for 
Heidegger is not an ethical concept, but it can be perfectly understood and interpreted within 
the framework of the philosophical mega-enterprise of fundamental ontology. It is not only 
that Heidegger himself warns us several times of the incorrectness of mistaking authenticity 
as ontic, instead of ontological, but also the very logic and word of Being and Time
consistently maintains that there is nothing of ethical relevance to it. Being and Time 
questions the meaning of Being, nothing less, nothing more. Since ethics, as a particular ontic 
field, is beyond ontological investigations, to me it seems too pushy to force moral 
dimensions into ontological notions, such as Geworfenheit or Eigentlichkeit. Not that 
Heidegger had no moral concerns. But authenticity, just as inauthenticity, is a mode of being, 
not a moral categoriy. As I have demonstrated, even the later works of Heidegger, which were 
written after the Kehre, do not alter the general picture that what he had been doing is 
ontology, not a moral quest. 
Among the results of the dissertation is the assertion that psychotherapy devoid of 
moral values is impossible to realize, because the therapist will always orient the patient in 
his self-interpreation, either by words, or by lack of words. As soon as we acknowledge this 
fact it becomes mere hypocrisy maintaining that the therapist does not influence the patient in 
any respect, and that the patient has to find his authentic mode of being only by himself. 
Psychotherapy has always been and always will be the expression of a certain ideology that 
defends and propagates a concrete set of values, no matter how subtly and undetectably it 
does so. Existential psychotherapy is committed to the ideal of authenticity which, in turn, is 
fully loaded by some very distinctly describable moral values. 
As for the accusations of deviance and immoralism, I am compelled to say that 
existential philosophy and psychiatry do, indeed, cultivate some sort of deviance from the 
traditional norms of the society, but does not, as a general rule, support immoralism. Except 
for the only Nietzsche nobody encourages people to kick up the dust, just for kicks. As a 
matter of fact, Nietzsche is not at all on the side of complete arbitrariness, but the reason why 
??
he stands up for the revaluation of values is in the hope of finding “more useful”, more noble 
values, replacing the current ones. Furthermore, immoralism is not even advocated by Sartre, 
even though for him, considering his metaphysical platform, it is harder to avoid immoralism 
than to accept it. Finally, existential psychotherapists can not in the least said to be favoring 
immoralism. Suffice it to say that they promote such traditional moral values as love, honesty, 
engagement, taking responsibility for one`s promises, and so forth. If existential 
psychotherapy supports deviance, it does so because it attempts to shake the foundations of 
the exclusivist tendencies of the society that attempts to “normalize” every individual to a 
very narrow standard of acceptable and desirable traits. In this respect, existential 
psychotherapy is markedly democratic and accepting. However, tolerance, taken to its exteme, 
is an ideal that is self-destructing: tolerating intolerance in obviously intolerable. That is why 
existential therapy`s tolerance also has its limits. 
When existential therapy advises us, “Be yourself!” a question arises instantly: who am 
I? Existentialism renders a promise towards the individual who wants only to shake off the 
heavy moral shackles of society. The promise consists of this: it is possible to find one`s 
genuine self, and as it happens, one finds oneself in an unimaginable spaciousness of freedom, 
after having been dipped into the uniqueness of one`s own being, a new, a happy, a truer life 
sets off. This vision, however, forgets to take it into account that the process of becoming 
ourselves is always a directed process. It is never me who fist thinks about the need and 
necessity to “truly” become myself. The particular culture which I live in radiates the 
expectation through many channels that I shall become myself. If it was not for the culture 
most probably it would never even cross my mind that I am not being myself. It is the culture 
that informs me, and, at the same time, creates the demand in me to be authentic. How was 
this demand created at the first place? According to Charles Taylor, it is due to countless 
historical, cultural, and philosophical interactions that we came to live in an era in which the 
“Ethics of Authenticity” rules. In this era our ways of thinking have been defined by the 
chase after our “genuine” and “real” selves. Everybody appears to know who he is and who 
he should become to be authentic. Then again, we hardly notice that the demand itself was 
not created by us: the want to become authentic does not come from our authentic decision. 
What this means is that the ideal of authenticity cannot be the only one, and perhaps it is not 
even of the better ones, to save people from unnecessary mental suffering. 
